Since the introduction of a formal commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Bebchuk, 1984; Shavell, 1988) to identify the optimal procedure to resolve cases in a context of uncertainty related to the law (L-uncertainty) and to the facts (F-uncertainty). We show that commitments are suboptimal when L-uncertainty is important. Furthermore, the generalized use of commitments creates an additional risk of under-enforcement when F-uncertainty is significant.
Introduction
In 2003, a reform of European Union ("EU") competition law entitled the European Commission ("the Commission") to enter into formal settlements with parties suspected of infringement of Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU ("TFEU"). In exchange for "commitments"from suspected firms to change something in their behavior or in their structure, the Commission is ready to close proceedings. Thanks to this new procedure, the Commission can allegedly restore market competition quickly. 1 From a legal standpoint, the commitments procedure (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has four main features. First, it can be applied both in anticompetitive agreements (i.e, joint ventures, distribution agreements, etc.) and abuse or dominance cases. However, it is excluded in cartel cases (the law says that Article 9 commitments are inappropriate in cases that would otherwise deserve fines). Second, its use is optional. When firms propose changes to their conduct to allay the Commission's concerns, the agency keeps the choice between agreeing on the proposed concessions (and rendering them mandatory) or pursuing with conventional proceedings with a view to adopting an infringement decision (Article 7 of Council Regulation 1/2003) . Whilst in theory, the commitments must be offered by the parties, at their initiative, and the Commission has little choice over this, the practice is that the Commission will often manifest that it is ready to receive settlement proposals from the parties. For instance, in the Google case, the Commissioner for competition explicitly asked Google to formulate commitments proposals. In the literature, most observers confirm that the Commission has some control over the choice of the procedural route (Mariniello, 2013) . Third, commitments decisions do not give rise to an afflictive finding of infringement. When a case is closed under the commitments procedure, the Commission does not expressly establish that the firm is guilty of infringement. 2 It suffice for the Commission to show in a "Preliminary Assessment"or in a "summary of the main facts"that the firm's conduct raises serious doubts of infringement. At the end of the line, there is no record of infringement for the investigated firm. In turn, the case is over when the Commission and the parties settle over proposed commitments and the Commission renders them legally binding. Fourth, the commitments procedure gives rise to the adoption of behavioral or struc-1 tural remedies. No fines are imposed in such cases (unless the parties shirk their obligations, for instance in the Microsoft case of 2013), and no damages are paid to the victims of the disputed conduct. Importantly, the Commission does not need to show that the proposed remedies are proportionate, i.e. that they are suitable and that they do not exceed what is appropriate and necessary. Given that the parties have offered them, the remedies can thus be disproportionate (the Commission must simply verify that the parties have not proposed a less onerous remedy). In practice, the Commission extensively uses the commitments procedure. Between May 2004 and February 2014, the Commission adopted 29 commitments decisions under Article 9 and 11 prohibition decisions under Article 7.
In the literature, the commitments procedure is often described as a superior alternative to standard proceedings under Article 7. Arguably, under Article 9, the Commission would be able to reach similar market outcomes, without however enduring the same procedural inefficiencies. Some, have praised commitments decisions as a "win-win"instrument for both the Commission and the alleged infringer (Bellis, 2013) . Both, who operate under resource constraints, can save time and money as they can close the case more quickly: they do not need to discuss in detail the theory of harm and evidence, and they "avoid lengthy oral and written adversarial proceedings"(even though in some cases commitments cases last longer than conventional infringement cases, e.g. Rio Tinto which lasted almost 5 years). In addition, the firm under investigation avoids a variety of supplementary costs. First, committing firms avoid administrative fines. Second, given that firms are not formally declared guilty of infringement, the risk of being brought to court in "follow-on actions"for antitrust damages decreases. And even if brought to justice, the success of such follow-on actions is unlikely, because commitments decisions do not clearly set out a theory of harm and quantify the harmful effect of the impugned conduct, leaving to the victims before the court the difficult task of quantifying the damage. Finally, firms limit the reputational damage of infringement decisions.
In this paper, we show that the commitments decision procedure is not simply a fast-track replica of the standard procedure, that entitles the Commission to achieve similar market results without, however, being constrained by similar procedural inefficiencies. 3 Rather, our main finding is that the outcomes and remedies imposed differ significantly in the two procedures. 4 To that end, we represent the interaction between the Commission and market players as a classic cat and mouse game with three main features. First, the Commission potentially faces different types of firms, responsible for a major or minor harm, adopting or not an unlawful conduct. The Commission is unaware of the firm's type so that there is uncertainty and asymmetric information.
Second, the Commission has two categories of procedural tools to enforce EU competition rules. On the one hand, the Commission can resort to the standard infringement procedure under Article 7. With this, the Commission carries out a painstaking, facts-intensive investigation in order to precisely establish the infringement as a matter of law and to measure the anticompetitive harm, as a matter of facts. Then, if necessary the Commission can impose a type-related remedy or close the case if no infringement can be legally established. In legal terms, the standard procedure finds who is guilty or innocent, and setting appropriate corrective measures. In economic terms, the standard procedure bridges the information gap between the Commission and the firm.
On the other hand, the Commission can resort to the commitments procedure under Article 9. In this variant, the Commission does not carry out a lengthy, facts-intensive investigation. The Commission uses the threat of a sanction in the standard Article 7 procedure in order to convince a firm to offer commitments and in turn settle. The expected sanction determines an upper limit on the commitments that the firm is ready to accept. In this procedure, the Commission possibly saves time and resources, but it fails to discover the firm's type entirely. In legal terms, the commitments procedure does not entitle the Commission to know who is guilty and innocent, and to devise a tailor-made remedy. In economic terms, settlements do not allow the Commission to bridge the information gap as the standard procedure.
Third, as a matter of policy, the Commission can and does follow three types of enforcement policies: a standard enforcement policy, a selective commitments policy, a generalized commitments policy.
In the standard enforcement policy, the Commission takes all types of cases under Article 7, discovers the firm's type and sets a sanction and a remedy on this basis. The EU lawmakers have indicated that the standard enforcement policy is the one applicable in cases that normally deserve in principle a fine, such as cases of hardcore restrictions (cartels, resale price maintenance, etc.). Firms that participate to such anticompetitive agreeplace. Choné et al. (2014) show that the antitrust authority decreases deterrence when it uses commitments. ments know that, if found out, they will face lengthy proceedings and a likely fine.
In the selective commitments policy, the Commission makes a mixed use of Article 7 and Article 9 for cases where the suspected infringement, the relevant markets and the potential remedies are similar. 5 This is the policy that was recently followed in the Samsung (Article 9), and Motorola (Article 7) cases (related to abusive litigation by patent holders), in the Microsoft I (Article 7) and Microsoft II (Article 9) cases (related to the tying of Windows with complementary softwares), or in the Mastercard (Article 7) and Visa (Article 9) cases (related to multilateral interchange fees).
Finally, in the generalized commitments policy, the Commission uses article 9 in all cases, and accepts, applies and makes binding commitments from all types of firms (generalized commitments). This is the policy that the Commission has expressly adopted in several sectors, such as "markets in the process of liberalization"or "fast moving markets such as the IT sector" (European Commission, 2014) . We talk of generalized commitments as meaning either that the Commission has set as a decisional practice to treat a majority (if not all) cases of a certain type under Article 9, or has expressed a marked preference for this procedure. This, for instance, is the case in the energy sector where the Commission has closed 9 cases with commitments since 2007.
In this paper, we seek to assess the costs and benefits of those various approaches in terms of type-I (over-enforcement), type-II (under-enforcement) errors and procedural costs. We show that when the Commission applies generalized commitments, this leads to both over and under enforcement of competition law. Over enforcement because all firms systematically settle whilst not all of them would have been guilty in the formal procedure. In other words, the Commission applies remedies to non cases. Under enforcement because remedies are lower compared to those that would be imposed in the formal procedure. Given the asymmetry of information, in order to convince all possible types to settle, the Commission must accept commitments that are set a minima i.e. equal to the expected sanction of the lowest possible type. Put differently, there is a sort of "race to the bottom"effect with generalized commitments. As a result of this, we conclude that, under a generalized commitments policy, the Commission remedies too often but remedies are too weak. This under enforcement effect could be mitigated if the commitments procedure was used selectively, with the Commission agreeing to settle with firms offering strong remedies and launching the formal procedure for those who offer weak or no remedies. Being selective in the use of commitments is a tool to bridge the information gap and limit the under enforcement problem associated with commitments.
With this background, a key tenet of our model is that the choice of a generalized commitments policy, of a selective commitments policy or of the standard enforcement policy should hinge on the underlying case uncertainty. There are two sources of uncertainty in our model: the availability of legal guidance (Law, or L) and the factual knowledge of the market (Facts, or F). When there is little F-uncertainty, there is a limited race to the bottom effect. Surely, there remains the risk of remedying a non-case but this, essentially, is linked to the importance of the L-uncertainty. Thus, when there is little F and L uncertainty, the generalized use of the article 9 procedure is apposite. When the case is more uncertain, it is optimal to use a procedure that is able to screen between types: the selective commitments when there is more F-uncertainty, the formal procedure when there is more L-uncertainty.
Concretely, this means for instance that in sectors like utilities (telecommunications, energy, rail...) with a strong case law and where the agencies are familiar with the market, generalized commitments are appropriate, provided that an appropriate structural or behavioral remedy is available. In contrast, the generalized commitments policy is not appropriate in sectors where uncertainty, and in particular the the factual uncertainty, is larger like the high-tech sector. In such settings, generalized commitments should be used parsimoniously; a "settle them all policy"brings the risk of both under remedying important abuse cases and of solving "non-cases"i.e. settling cases that have no chance of being established with the formal procedure. When there is a lot of legal uncertainty, for instance because the case raises novel issues, then it is recommended to treat the case under the article 7 formal procedure 6 , to establish law (L) and facts (F). Otherwise, there is a risk of generalized under-enforcement and over-enforcement. Commitments should be used for mature cases and not for to address novel legal issues.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2 and the main results in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss several extensions of the model. In Section 5, we discuss the European Commission's decisional practices in the light of our model. We conclude in Section 6.
We analyze a game between a competition authority (the "Commission") and a firm. The game starts with the Commission opening an investigation against a firm suspected of abuse(s) of dominance. The reasons underpinning the opening of investigations are manifold: complaints from rivals, customers, suppliers or trade associations, notification of a possible infringement by national competition authorities or sector specific regulators, allegations of abuse in the public domain (press, academic research, etc.). The Commission normally opens formal proceedings with a view to adopting a decision, be it an infringement, a commitments, or an inapplicability decision.
To enforce EU competition rules, the Commission must establish an infringement based on a theory of harm, measure its actual or likely anticompetitive effects, and design a suitable remedy that brings them to an end. In stylized terms, the Commission therefore needs two inputs to make a case, law and facts. The law means the ability of the Commission to frame the suspected practice under a known category of infringement in positive law. The facts means the ability of the Commission to establish and measure anticompetitive harm, as a matter of fact.
Uncertainty

F-Uncertainty
In our model, the firm under investigation causes a "harm"that we denote by H. This harm can come in the form of supra-competitive prices, rival foreclosure, delay in the introduction of new products, etc. The importance of the harm is a priori unknown to the Commission and this uncertainty is linked to the factual issues related to the case. We will refer to it as factual or F-uncertainty. Several factors affect the importance of the harm: size and number of relevant markets affected by the conduct, size of the suspected firm's market shares, size of barriers to entry and scale, inelasticity of demand, duration of the alleged anticompetitive abuse, interest rates on financial markets, etc. At the beginning of the procedure, there is an initial asymmetry of information between the Commission and the firm in respect of the facts. Due to its greater proximity to the industry, the firm has some private information that the Commission does not have, and it can thus assess more accurately the importance of the harm caused to rivals or 6 customers. 7 We will model this uncertainty by assuming that the firm under scrutiny can be of two possible types. We represent the type of the firm by a parameter θ ∈ {θ, θ}. Firm with type θ is responsible for a harm amounting H(θ) and we assume that 0 ≤ H(θ) ≤ H(θ). In other words, the firm with type θ is responsible for a minor harm H(θ) = H while the firm with type θ is responsible for a major harm H(θ) = H. The difference between the harm inflicted for a major and a minor harm (H − H) will be our measure of the F-uncertainty. At the initial investigation stage, the Commission is unaware of the firm's type which is private information to the firm. Nevertheless, the Commission has some "reasonable indications" that there might be a major harm represented by a prior probability ν that the firm is of type θ: ν = P rob(θ = θ).
L-Uncertainty
In our model, the harm is caused by a practice that can be legal or illegal. The practice is illegal if it fits within a known category of infringement, and if it fulfills the requirements defined in the law to that end i.e. if it meets what legal practitioners call the "legal test"or "legal standard". In practice, a large amount of resources is invested in trying to match harm to law. We will assume that it is not always possible for the Commission to establish an infringement as a matter of law.
The firm has superior information about the importance of the harm (major, minor), but it does not know whether the infringement can be established as a matter of law. If the Commission investigates the case under the standard adversarial procedure (Article 7), it will be able to establish the infringement with probability p. In the following sections, the probability p will be our measure of legal uncertainty (L-uncertainty). A high probability p means that, given the applicable law, the firm's liability for an unlawful abuse is more likely, or easy, to be established. The L-uncertainty depends on a range of factors: absence of judicial precedent, divergences in precedents, weakness of precedent, inaccuracy of precedent, age of precedent, inconsistency in precedents, existence of ongoing proceedings on a similar legal issue before the review and appeals courts, absence of guidance from other official instruments, such as positive and negative decisions, guidelines, notices, communications, reports, etc., "classifiability"of the conduct as a restriction of competition by object, subject to a per se or quasi per se legal regime, lack of legal scholarship on the issue under investigation, risk of discrepancies with international practice and amount, expertise and experience of lawyers representing the firm, etc.
States of the world
To summarize, combining the two sources of uncertainty, there are four possible states of the world.
1. In State 1, the firm has caused a major harm and an anticompetitive infringement can be established as a matter of law. The probability of being in State 1 is pν.
2. In State 2, the firm has caused a minor harm and an anticompetitive infringement can be established as a matter of law. The probability of being in State 2 is p(1 − ν).
3. In State 3, the firm is responsible for a major harm and an anticompetitive infringement cannot be established as a matter of law. The probability of being in State 3 is (1 − p)ν.
4.
In State 4 the firm is responsible for a minor harm and an anticompetitive infringement cannot be established as a matter of law. The probability of being in State 4 is (1 − p)(1 − ν).
In our model, we do not consider the possibility that the firm is not responsible of any harm but the harm is not always imputable to an unlawful conduct. If there is no anticompetitive infringement, the competition authority has no reasons to intervene.
Payoffs
In the optimal world, the Commission seeks to remedy all harm that constitutes an established infringement as a matter of law, and does not seek to remedy other cases. Those other cases are normally closed by the Commission. For instance, in the Velux case, the Commission concluded that the rebates offered by the suspected dominant company were not anti-competitive (Neven and de La Mano, 2010) . Qualcomm (2009), Apple iTunes (2008) and
MathWorks (2014) are other examples of cases that the Commission closed without finding an unlawful anticompetitive practice, sometimes after long investigations. When anticompetitive harm is established, the Commission can impose a remedy R. The first best policy consists in setting R = H in State 1, R = H in State 2 and R = 0 in States 3 and 4. Like any decision maker, the Commission seeks to avoid type-I and type-II errors, i.e. remedy cases where the infringement is not/cannot be established; unremedy cases where the infringement is/can be established. Moreover, the Commission wants to avoid the application of excessive or insufficient remedies in cases of established infringements. 8 Following that, we will say that the payoffs (V ) to the Commission when it imposes a remedy R are equal to −|R − H| if there is an infringement and to −R otherwise. 9 The profit of the firm is equal to π from which the remedy (if any) must be subtracted.
3 Two procedures, three policies
The procedures
To remedy the abusive practice efficiently, the Commission must bridge the information gap and assess the harm created by the firm. To do so, the Commission has two alternatives: follow the standard infringement procedure (Article 7) or negotiating commitments with the firm (Article 9).
The standard infringement procedure (Article 7)
The Commission operates on budget constraints and following the standard infringement procedure is costly. The cost of the procedure is set to c > 0. If the Commission agrees to invest c, it will either establish the infringement (with probability p) and subsequently quantify the harm H or discover that no infringement can be established (with probability (1 − p)). With the standard infringement procedure, the Commission is able to implement the first best policy at cost c.
The commitments procedure (Article 9)
As an alternative to the infringement procedure, the firm and the Commission can enter into settlement talks, with a view to closing the case in exchange for behavioral or structural commitments. This negotiation process, formally enshrined in Article 9, has several important features. First, the Commission has the option to return to the standard infringement procedure at any time i.e. if the parties fail to reach an agreement. Second, under Article 9, commitments should be proposed by the firm, implying that the firm is not obliged to participate in the negotiation. Third, with the commitments procedure, the parties and the Commission avoid lengthy oral and written proceedings and, in line with that, we assume that negotiating settlements is costless for both parties. In other words, the cost c represents the additional cost of the formal procedure. 10 The negotiation of commitments takes place under asymmetric information and we will (by assumption) consider that the Commission has all the bargaining power. The firm has the option to refuse the negotiation. In that case, the Commission has the option to start the infringement procedure.
If the firm agrees to start the negotiation, we suppose that it takes place as follows:
1. The Commission makes a take-it-or-leave it offer R to the firm, 2. The firm accepts or refuses the offer,
• If the firm accepts the offer, the Commission makes the commitments legally binding and the remedy R is implemented.
• If the firm refuse the offer, the Commission may launch an infringement procedure or abandon the case.
If the negotiation fails, the Commission can abandon the case or move back to the standard infringement procedure. If the Commission chooses the latter option, the infringement procedure determines the default point for accepting commitments.
Given the risk of type-I error (remedying a non case), the Commission never negotiates commitments when there is too much L-uncertainty. In particular, if p < 1 2 , any remedy R > 0 would decrease the Commission's payoff. For this reason, we assume that p ≥ 1 2 .
The policies
Combining the two procedures, the Commission can follow three enforcement policies: a generalized enforcement policy, a generalized commitments policy and a selective commitments policy.
Generalized enforcement
In the generalized enforcement policy, the Commission exclusively uses the adversarial procedure of the Article 7. With this procedure, the Commission pays the cost c, discovers the state of the world and implements the first best policy. The payoffs of the Commission are then equal toV = −c.
The payoffs to the firm with type θ are π − R(θ) if it is found liable of an infringement and zero otherwise. 11 The expected payoffs to the firm with type θ are then equal toπ
If instead of launching the adversarial procedure, the Commission closes the case immediately without further investigation or negotiation, its payoffs would be equal to V = −(νpH + (1 − ν)pH). These payoffs represent the expected cost of leaving anticompetitive harms non remedied. In the sequel, we assume that the Commission prefers to starts an infringement procedure, that is:
Selective commitments
When the Commission uses, the Article 9 procedure, it has two options. It can either use the procedure to screen among the two types of firm (selective commitments), or treat all types equally (generalized commitments). With selective commitments, the Commission screens the two types of firm. To that end, it offers them two different tracks to solve the case: the commitments procedure for a firm with type θ and the formal procedure for a firm with type θ. To be feasible, the proposed commitments R must be such that the type θ accepts the commitments but the type θ refuses them. Formally, R must satisfy:
π − R ≤π(θ).
These equations imply R ∈ [pH, pH]. If the Commission has all the bargaining power, then it sets R = pH. The commitments agreed upon by the firm θ are equivalent to the expected remedy imposed in the infringement procedure but commitments are negotiated at no cost. In a nutshell, the selective commitments procedure uses the threat of going back to Article 7 to extract strong commitments from the firm. 12 The threat of moving back to the Article 7 procedure is the cornerstone of the selective commitment policy. Without this threat, firms have no incentive to agree on strong commitments. This separating mechanism works if -when commitments are refused, thus signaling a type θ-the Commission decides to return to the infringement procedure at cost c. Otherwise, anticipating a termination of the case after having refused strong commitments, no type will ever agree to settle. A separating equilibrium is feasible only if the Commission is better off starting an infringement procedure when it knows that it faces a firm with type θ. Formally, the condition writes as follow:
Article 7 procedure is not credible and this obviously leads to the collapse of the selective commitments policy, as no firm would ever accepts commitments in these conditions. Thus, Equation (4) is a necessary condition for the selective use of the two procedures. 13 Under the condition of Equation (4), the payoffs of the Commission are equal to:
The first term in the above equation is the cost of commitments. It consists in a cost of both under-and over-enforcement of the law. Under-enforcement because, for the harm that would have been established, the remedy is insufficient (R < H), thereby reducing the Commission's payoffs by (H −pH).
Over-enforcement because, for the infringements that would not have been legally established, a remedy is applied, decreasing the Commission's payoffs by R. In contrast to the formal procedure, the Commission here applies a weaker remedy but then does so more often. And this cost of commitments directly depends on legal uncertainty. As a result, when the probability of conviction p increases, the cost of commitments decreases. This cost should be traded-off with the savings generated by the procedure. As there is no afflictive finding of infringement in the commitments procedure, a firm who settles avoids the intangible cost of being found guilty such as a damaged reputation. If there is a reputational cost set to d > 0 associated with a formal sanction, the firm's payoff under Article 7 becomeŝ π(θ) = π − p(H(θ) + d).
As the payoffπ(θ) determines the default point for negotiating commitments, when the firm suffers a higher reputation cost, the Commission is able to extract stronger commitments from the firm and mitigate the under-enforcement problem. Eventually, for d sufficiently important, the under-enforcement problem we identified may turn to an over-enforcement problem.
Generalized commitments
The alternative for the Commission is to propose commitmentsR that would be accepted by both types. Such commitments must satisfy:
π −R ≥π(θ).
From these equations, it must be clear that the proposed commitments are softer in the pooling case as the two conditions implyR ≤ pH. With this pooling mechanism, all firms agree on the proposed commitments. Those who are responsible for a high harm because the remedy is less severe (in average) compared to the formal procedure (and the selective commitments). Those who are responsible for a low harm because commitments are equivalent (in average) to the remedy imposed with the judicial track. Assumption 1 guarantees that generalized commitments are credible i.e. should a firm refuses the commitments, it will be formally prosecuted by the Commission at cost c. Finally, note that neither type finds it profitable to refuse the commitments.
With the generalized commitments, the payoffs to the Commission are equal to:
The payoffs for the Commission can be decomposed as a cost of commitments and a cost of under enforcement, measured respectively by the first and the second term in Equation (11). The cost of commitments is the cost of applying too often a remedy that is too weak. The first term in Equation (11) measures this cost. It is similar in structure to the cost of commitments identified in the selective commitments policy. This cost is increased by the fact that the Commission settles more often but it is decreased by the fact that the remedy is smaller. But applying a weaker remedy has a cost too, when the firm is responsible for a major harm. There is an additional cost of under enforcement because major anticompetitive harms cannot be appropriately remedied. The second term in Equation (11) measures this cost. This cost is linked to the importance of the F-uncertainty. The larger the difference (H − H), the greater the under-enforcement cost. This underenforcement cost also increases with p as a higher probability of conviction implies that under-enforcement of the law is more likely.
Comparisons
The use of the commitments procedure creates two specific costs: a cost of commitments and a cost of under-enforcement. The first arises because of L-uncertainty. Commitments are negotiated without knowing which case would be successful or not in court. Thus, commitments replicate the standard procedure in average, leading to both over-and under-enforcement. And, should the L-uncertainty decrease, the cost of commitments decreases. The cost of under-enforcement is specifically linked to the generalized commitments and the absence of screening between types. This under-enforcement is particularly problematic when there is an important F-uncertainty. On the other hand, commitments avoid part or all of the costs of the legal procedure. Trading off these three dimensions, our objective is to determine the Commission's preferred route to end up a case. To that end, we compare the Commission's payoffs in the three cases,V , V and V . We start by a comparison of the generalized use of Article 7, giving payoffs of V , and the generalized use of Article 9, giving payoffs ofṼ . The functionṼ is U-shaped in p. Thus, the equationṼ = V admits two roots, p − 1 and p + 1 formally defined as:
Let us consider the cases in turn. The first condition holds true if, for p = 1,Ṽ ≥ V :
This condition guarantees that p + 1 ≤ 1, meaning that generalized commitments dominate generalized infringement if there is little L-uncertainty (p ≥ p + 1 ) and little F-uncertainty for condition (12) to hold true. With little L-uncertainty, the cost of commitments is small but the cost of overenforcement is high unless factual uncertainty is limited. We thus need a combination of limited L and F uncertainty for the optimality of generalized commitments.
Turning to the second case, the second roots p − 1 is higher than 1 2 if:
Again, this condition can be satisfied only if there is little F-uncertainty.
In that case however, generalized commitments are preferred if there is an important L-uncertainty (a low p). The reasoning mirrors the above one.
For low values of p, the cost of commitments is high but the cost of overenforcement is limited, especially if there is little factual uncertainty. Summarizing our findings we have:
Lemma 1 If condition (12) holds true, the generalized use of Article 9 dominates the generalized use of Article 7 if there is little L-uncertainty, p ≥ p + 1 . If condition (13) holds true, the generalized use of Article 9 dominates the generalized use of Article 7 if there is a large L-uncertainty, p ≤ p − 1 . In addition, we can show that an increase in F-uncertainty decreases the parameter space for which generalized commitments dominate.
Corollary 1 An increase in F-uncertainty increases p + 1 and decreases p − 1 . Next, we integrate the selective commitments in our comparisons. Selective commitments are feasible if Equation (4) holds true. If it is not the case, then the Commission is left with only two possible procedural routes and the optimal choice is described in Lemma 1. From now on, we suppose that selective commitments are feasible pH ≥ c.
Comparing selective commitments and the generalized infringement procedure, the former dominates the later if (4), the selective use of Article 7 and Article 9 dominates dominates the generalized use of Article 7 if there is little L-uncertainty, p ≥ p 2 , or if the cost of the procedure is prohibitively high c ≥ H/2.
Selective commitments are associated with a cost of commitments but allows the Commission to make savings on procedural costs. If L-uncertainty is low enough, the cost of commitments is limited and the selective use of the two procedures dominates the generalized use of the infringement procedure. Notice that F-uncertainty plays no role in this comparison as, in both cases, the Commission bridges the information gap and discovers the firm's type either through the case investigation or by the firm's decision to refuse the proposed commitments.
Last, we compare selective and generalized commitments. It can be shown that the condition for having V ≥Ṽ for p = 1 2 is equivalent to 16 condition (4). Thus, if generalized commitments dominate, it is only for larger values of p. This implies that the possibility of having generalized commitments that are optimal when the L-uncertainty is large is a specific result that only emerges when the Commission cannot commit ex-ante to a credible policy announcement to limit the use of commitments. Given the preceeding, the equationṼ = V admits at most one root p 3 in [ 1 2 , 1] defined as:
Comparing the different thresholds p + 1 , p 2 and p 3 , we can describe the optimal procedural track. Despite their analytical complexity, our comparisons produce clear-cut qualitative results that can be summarized as follows. First, there is a specific cost associated with the negotiation of commitments, and this cost increases with L-uncertainty. So an important L-uncertainty is against commitments, in general. Second, there is a specific under enforcement cost when commitments are generalized and this cost increases with factual uncertainty. So, an important F-uncertainty is against generalized commitments. Commitments therefore are only recommended when there is little L-uncertainty. If this limited L-uncertainty is associated with a large factual uncertainty, selective commitments are recommended. If it is associated with a limited F-uncertainty, generalized commitments are recommended. The figure below offers a quick summary of these policy recommendations.
Extensions
Limited behavioral and structural remedies
In the baseline model, we supposed that the remedies the Commission can impose with the commitments procedure and the infringement procedure are equivalent. But, as explained above, the Commission has at its disposal a larger range of sanctions when it uses the infringement procedure, as it can can impose remedies and fines while the latter are excluded from the commitments procedure. Moreover, decisions adopted under article 7 proceedings act as a trigger for follow-on damages actions before the courts, thus giving a higher probability that H will be fully remedied. This creates an additional difference between the two procedures. 14 To integrate these features in the model, we will consider that remedies are limited in scope. More precisely, we assume that the Commission cannot always perfectly remedy the harm without fines (and possible follow on actions for damages). Let us suppose that the highest possible remedy is set atR and pH <R < pH i.e. remedies cannot perfectly remedy a major harm. In that case, selective commitments are also associated with a cost of under enforcement. With selective commitments, the firm with type θ settles and the remedyR is implemented, while the firm with type θ is brought back in the formal procedure. The associated payoffs to the Commission are:
The negotiated remedy is insufficient when there is a major harm, creating a cost of under enforcement that can be measured by the last term in Equation (16). This cost comes in addition to the traditional cost of commitments identified above.
If instead the Commission uses the formal procedure, it can impose the remedyR and complement it with a fine f to fully compensate for the inflicted harm:R + f = H, leading to the same payoffs as before for the firm and the Commission (assuming that fines and remedies are perfectly substitutable). Finally, with generalized commitments, there is already an under-enforcement of competition law and, as long as pH ≤R, the payoffs are left unchanged.
When behavioral and structural remedies are limited, the selective use of Article 7 and Article 9 is associated with lower payoffs. Interestingly, the lower the possible remedyR, the higher the under enforcement problem. Selective commitments are therefore inappropriate when remedies are limited. Consequently, the optimal policy is generalized commitments or a generalized infringement, depending on L and F uncertainty.
Endogenous L-uncertainty
Legal uncertainty, that we considered so far to be exogenous, depends on a wide range of factors including the number and the precision of judicial and decisional precedents and the guidance provided by the Commission and the Courts. It is widely acknowledged that formal, Article 7, decisions contribute to the establishment of case law while commitments decisions do not. Therefore, when the Commission uses the formal procedure, resulting in an infringement or an inapplicability decision, this contributes to clarifying the law and, therefore, the L-uncertainty is partially endogenous to the enforcement policies selected and implemented by the Commission.
Suppose that, when the Commission uses the formal procedure, it contributes to a reduction of the L-uncertainty. This means that when the Commission takes an infringement decision, by establishing a precedent, it increases the probability p by a factor ∆ ≥ 0. Given that the payoffs associated with selective and generalized commitments are both increasing in p (provided that p is sufficiently large in the case ofṼ ), reducing L-uncertainty by taking infringement decisions reduces the cost of using the commitments procedure in the future.
If we adopt a dynamic perspective and we suppose that the Commission has to tackle different cases, using the formal procedure has an additional benefit as it reduces the cost of commitments for the coming cases. Reducing the L-uncertainty by ∆ reduces the cost of the generalized commitments by ∂Ṽ ∂p ∆. For that reason, there is an additional benefit in using the formal infringement procedure for novel cases. This later factor may explain observed differences in enforcement policies. For instance, despite their similarities, the telecommunications cases have been consistently dealt with under Article 7, whilst the energy cases have predominantly been scrutinized under the Article 9 procedure. This may reflect a two-stage policies for network industries, where in stage 1, the Commission sets precedents (in telecommunications, the first industry that was subject to liberalization measures), and in stage 2, the Commission makes use of this backbone of precedents to administer commitments. Against this backdrop, the policy currently followed in the pharmaceutical sector, where all cases are dealt with under Article 7, may just be stage 1 of a dynamic enforcement policy, whereby the Commission is trying to build a strong base of precedents, which will serve as a platform for future commitments in pharmaceutical cases.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the Commission's decisional policy in the past 10 years, in light of the findings of our model. We start with a brief statistical overview of the cases dealt under Article 7 and Article 9 and then we provide examples of the generalized commitments policy, the selective commitments policy and the standard enforcement policy.
Statistical overview
Since 1 May 2004, the Commission has officially adopted 11 antitrust decisions under the Article 7 standard procedure and 29 antitrust decisions under the article 9 commitments procedure. These statistics do not include unpublished decisions.
Of the 11 decisions under Article 7, the Commission's search engine indicates that 5 related to anticompetitive agreements cases under Article 101 TFEU and 6 were abuse of dominance cases under Article 102 TFEU. In the 29 decisions under Article 9, the Commission's search engine indicates that 23 were abuse of dominance cases and 16 were anticompetitive agreements. This is because 10 of those cases were examined under both legal provisions. 20
Generalized commitments: Energy and excessive pricing cases
As explained previously, there are generalized commitments when the Commission treats all cases under the Article 9 procedure. Put differently, there is a generalized commitments policy when the negotiation of commitments is the sole issue for a case. This is the policy followed in abuse of dominance cases in the energy sector or in relation to specific practices that the Commission has declared non-priority targets, such as exploitative abuses.
Energy
In the electricity and gas sectors, the Commission's decisional practice is clear. The conventional procedural route to handle such cases is the discussion of commitments. In 9 cases, the Commission closed abuse of dominance proceedings with commitments. 15 Of course, there is an exception to this. In March 2014, the Commission adopted an Article 7 decision and inflicted a A C1.031 m fine on OPCOM, the Romanian power exchange for having abused its dominant position. However, this only marginally alters the finding that abuse of dominance cases in the energy sector are subject to a generalized commitments policy. Against this background, our model would tend to classify the Commission's generalized commitments policy in the energy sector as close to optimality. This is because, in this sector, there is both little F-uncertainty and L-uncertainty.
In so far as F-uncertainty is concerned, we believe that the Commission's asymmetry of information with the firm is less marked than in other sectors. First, because the Commission's investigations in this sector often deal with incumbents conduct whose market dominant position is so obvious, that a large component of potential harm is established. Second, in the energy sector, the Commission enjoys a historically rich factual expertise, following the wide ranging "sector inquiry"that was completed in 2007. This exercise led the Commission to amass an incredible amount of information on energy markets across Europe. All stakeholders were consulted in the process, giving the Commission a 360 degree view on electricity and gas markets. Third, in energy markets, the Commission is not alone. It works in complementarity with 28 national regulatory authorities in gas and electricity and with a European-wide regulator (ACER, Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) whose purposes are to stimulate market competition. This unique institutional specificity has informational merits, for the Commission can rely on the assistance of those institutions to gather updated market data and expert opinions on energy-related issues.
In so far as L-uncertainty is concerned, of course, there are endogenously not many precedents from the EU courts in the energy sector. However, there is an abundance of precedents from the EU Court of Justice and from the General Court under Article 102 TFEU confirming that the Commission can prosecute a large range of abuses (exploitative and exclusionary), and discharge a relatively limited burden of proof to that end (the so-called forms-based approach). Moreover, on closer examination, none of the practices at hand in the energy sector appear relatively innovative and distinct from such precedents. Interestingly, many of those precedents concern network industry sectors. In CEZ, the pre-emptive reservation of transmission capacity that was deemed to deprive rivals from means of competing, and to limit entry, was akin to an exclusive purchasing contract. In RWE gas foreclosure, the Commission took objection to a plain vanilla refusal of access by RWE to its transport network, and to the setting of excessive prices that squeezed rivals. Finally, in Distrigaz and in Long term electricity contracts in France, the Commission combatted a classic example of exclusive dealing, by remedying to long duration contracts with energy customers.
Non priority cases (excessive pricing)
A second illustration of the generalized commitments policy can be found in non-priority cases. These non priority cases relate to conducts or sectors for which the Commission has explicitly manifested disinterest in public statements. A good illustration of this relates to exploitative abuses, and in particular excessive pricing for which the Commission expressly manifested a lack of interest in its 2009 Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities and all cases have been handled under the Article 9 procedure.
In S&P, the Commission scrutinized the prices charged by Standard & Poors for the distribution of International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs) in Europe to information service providers (news agencies, such as Reuters, Bloomberg, etc.) and financial institutions (banks, etc.) . ISINs are the international key identifiers for securities based on the international standard ISO 6166. ISINs are indispensable for a number of operations such as interbank communication, clearing and settlement, custody, reporting to authorities and reference data management. S&P has been designated by the American Bankers Association as the competent National Numbering Agency and as such enjoyed a monopoly for distribution of US ISINs. The ISO however provided for cost-recovery principles, the fair pricing of ISIN, and the absence of charge for indirect users (i.e. financial institutions that source their ISIN from information service providers, together with other data). S&P however levied charges on indirect users, and applied charges in excess of costs on direct users. Moreover, S&P charged for access to the full ISIN database rather than to the relevant ISIN number. The Commission had concerns that S&P may have charged unfairly high prices for the distribution of US ISINs in Europe in breach of EU antitrust rules on the abuse of a dominant market position. However, it brought the case to a settlement, under which S&P committed to abolish all charges to indirect users for the use of ISINs within the EU. In respect of direct users and ISPs, S&P committed to distribute ISIN records separately from other added value information at an initial price of $15,000 per year.
In a second case, Rambus, the Commission expressed concerns that Rambus Inc. might have abused a dominant position by intentionally concealing from the JEDEC SSO -in which Rambus participated-that it had patents and patent applications which were relevant to technology used in DRAM standards 16 being adopted by JEDEC, and subsequently claiming unreasonable royalties for those patents from suppliers of DRAM products. The Commission's view was that absent its intentionally deceptive conduct, Rambus would not have been able to charge the royalties it subsequently did. The Commission eventually closed its investigation by adopting an Article 9 decision that rendered legally binding commitments offered by Rambus including a promise to cap the royalties that it would charge for certain patents essential for those DRAM products.
Excessive pricing cases do not generate much discussion in terms of Luncertainty. Article 102(a) prohibits dominant firms from directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions. And it is abundantly clear that this provision provides a textual legal basis to catch dominant firms exploitative prices. Since the late 1970s, the case-law has confirmed that EU competition agencies and courts could administer Article 102(a) to curb dominant firms exploitative prices (United Brands, 1978) . The fact that the Commission has made little use of it is a deliberate policy choice.
Excessive pricing cases generate more debates in terms of F-uncertainty. There is a widespread view that competition authorities lack the informa-tion and expertise necessary -particularly on the competitive price level -to carry out price controls (Fisher and McGowan, 1983) . This requires significant resources and expertise in a vast array of disciplines, including not only law and economics but also accounting and financial analysis. Accordingly, this task would be better left to sector-specific regulators (Motta and de Streel, 2006) .
Second, there is a complete uncertainty on the incentive effects of high prices. In particular, the view that high prices are self-correcting remains widespread, and that if competition agencies were ever to apply Article 102(a) to dominant firms prices, they might deter competitive entry, and therefore undermine the dynamic nature of the competitive process. This idea is deeply rooted in policy and academic circles in the US and has enjoyed increased traction in the EU (Gal, 2004) . However, it has also been convincingly challenged by other scholars, who show that if post-entry the dominant firm decreases prices as the theory predicts, then there should be no entry in the first place (Ezrachi and Gilo, 2009) .
In this context, one may question the application of a generalized commitments policy in relation to practices whose F-uncertainty remain high. It is commonly accepted that the level at which Rambus agreed to cap its royalties (1.5%) was higher than that it could realistically have expected to obtain in the market in other words, that the commitments decision under-remedied the issue (Rato and Petit, 2013 ).
Selective commitments
The selective commitments policy is applied when the Commission entertains article 9 settlement talks with the parties, but maintains an effective threat to return to the article 7 standard procedure. The threat can be direct, as in the (ongoing) Gazprom case. But it can also be indirect, as in Samsung and Motorola or in Visa and Mastercard, where the Commission pursued in parallel two similar cases under the two procedures. According to our model, the selective commitments policy is recommended when there is little L-uncertainty but possibly a large F-uncertainty.
Gazprom
The high profile case against Gazprom is a possible example of selective commitments policy. Although little has filtered of this ongoing case, we know that after early protestations from Gazprom following the initiation of proceedings in 2011, settlements talks were started with the support -and possibly at the initiative -of the Commission. In December 2013, the European Commissioner for competition revealed to the press that Gazprom was close to submitting a draft settlement proposal under Article 9. However, following the turn of events in Ukraine, the Commissioner for competition announced that a settlement under Article 9 was no longer in the cards. According to the Financial Times, the Commissioner said at a public conference that "Plan A is to continue working on the statement of objections and, when it is ready, to adopt it". 17 Similarly, in an email to Bloomberg of March 2014, the Commissions spokesman maintained the pressure, confirming that the Commission "continue[s] to work on the preparation of the draft statement of objections, which has not been finalized at this point". 18 Some journalists consider that the Commission might be tempted to delay the case or use it as additional leverage in political negotiations with Russia. To that end, the Commission may have interrupted settlements talks, and returned to the standard procedure under Article 7 TFEU. On the basis of the information in the public domain, we understand that the Commissions main concerns center first on Gazproms "pegging" (or linking) of the price of gas and oil in long-term supply contracts with its European customers. In other words, the price of gas would be unjustifiably indexed to the price of oil. Whilst this was standard practice in gas markets in the past, the way this indexation mechanism has been used by Gazprom has led to divergences in prices across countries (Western countries pay little, Eastern countries pay more), and the Commission suspects that this is not in line either with economic fundamentals. Second, the Commission seems also concerned by the fact that Gazprom has inserted "destination clauses" into its contracts with Estearn and Central European buyers to prevent the later to resell gas to third customers in other countries. These clauses may have prevented Eastern and Central European suppliers from shipping Russian gas to other destinations within the European Union. In light of the available evidence, and of the fact that the case is still ongoing, it is very difficult to assess it from the standpoint of L and F-uncertainty, and our analysis will remain general. In so far as L-uncertainty is concerned, we know that excessive or discriminatory pricing are covered both by the text law and by precedents in the case-law. Moreover, destination clauses fall foul of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and have on numerous occasions been condemned as a "hardcore infringement" of EU competition law regardless of their market effects. With this, we can thus assume a limited L-uncertainty. In contrast, it is much more difficult to assess the degree of F-uncertainty in this case. On the facts, Gazprom dominance and the market definition appear uncontentious indeed. In our opinion however establishing the harm inflicted by the indexation mechanism is a much more complex issue.
Standard Essential Patents
The Samsung and Motorola decisions are a good example of a selective commitments policy. By way of reminder, those two cases arose in the context of the so-called smartphone war. Back in 2011, Apple ignited a worldwide patent war with Samsung for alleged infringement of several design patents. Apple contended before US courts that Samsung's phones copied some features of its iPhone. In Apple's view, Samsung infringed 4 of its design patents on the shape of the initial iPhone, as well as a number of design patents on various graphical user interfaces (icons for applications). Samsung replicated 6 days later by starting patent litigation in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom, and asking the court to remove Apple's allegedly infringing product from the market. Amongst the patents in suit were, however, a number of so-called standard essential patents (SEP) on 2G and 3G mobile telephony that Samsung had previously committed to grant access to on so-called FRAND terms. In defense, Apple thus argued that Samsung's actions for infringement were a violation of its FRAND promises and this was in turn akin to an unlawful abuse of a dominant position. Apple subsequently lodged abuse of dominance complaints against Samsung before the Commission, arguing that with Samsung was using courts proceedings as a bargaining device, to extract from Apple supracompetitive licensing terms, a strategy known as "patent holdup" (Shapiro, 2001) . Apple also lodged similar complaints against Motorola.
In April 2014, the Commission adopted two decisions in those cases. The decision in the Samsung case is based on Article 9. With it, the Commission settled the case, in exchange for a commitment by Samsung to stop seeking injunctions in court, and to abide by a predetermined 12 months licensing framework. In contrast, the decision against Motorola is an article 7 decision that finds Motorola guilty of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, and that orders Motorola to cease seeking injunctions in court on the basis of the litigious SEPs.
Interestingly, since Apple's initial complaints of , the Commission ran both cases in parallel, though under distinct procedures. In this, the two cases are an example of selective commitments, because the firm that was discussing commitments with the Commission under Article 9 -Samsungcould credibly anticipate that a failure to reach commitments would expose it to a return to the Article 7 procedure, as this procedure was the one followed with another firm in parallel investigation. Unlike in Gazprom, the Commission did not need to make the threat of opening Article 7 proceedings explicit as the mere existence of a such procedure in a similar case rendered this threat credible. Surely, it may be argued that the threat remained imperfect, or lacked credibility because the cases were not really identical. In reality, however, both cases seem very similar. Both arose from informal complaints from the same company -Apple-made at a similar moment in time. Moreover, at a stylized level, both cases are similar in terms of legal and factual issues: they concern the right of standard essential patents (SEP) owners to enforce their intellectual property (IP) portfolios in court, by asking judges to grant injunctions preventing the sale of unlicensed rival products, despite the existence of a previous pledge to openly license on FRAND terms.
If we review those cases through the lenses of our model, it is strikingly clear that both cases were decided in a state of total L-uncertainty. As mentioned in a large number of academic papers, the legal standard applicable to the seeking of injunctions in Courts remains uncertain. Several tests compete in the case-law of the EU courts (Petit, 2013; Jones, 2013) . This was empirically confirmed in practice when two German courts in Dusseldorf and Manheim, confounded and puzzled by this state of legal uncertainty, respectively addressed requests for clarification to the Court of Justice of the European Union and to the EU Commission. Moreover, it is unclear whether those cases must be dealt with as exploitative abuse under the so-called hold-up theory of harm or as exclusionary abuse under a more conventional foreclosure theory of harm. In addition, some courts in the Member States have crafted new and distinct tests to deal with such cases (the German Supreme Court has for instance elaborated a novel legal theory called the Orange Book Standard to deal with such cases).
In so far as F-uncertainty is concerned, the discussion is less easy. To some extent, one must consider that the facts are well-established, given that it is easy to prove whether the companies have, or not, sought injunctions and have, or not, made FRAND pledges. Moreover, the relevant markets and the dominant position should be easy to establish, because the existence of a SEP gives rise to a licensing market on which the patent holder is likely dominant. The main uncertainty concerns the harm inflicted to rivals. The rate of award of injunctions by courts is indeed unclear. There is thus some uncertainty as to whether SEPs holder can at all resort to injunctions in order to extract supra competitive royalties or cross-licensing terms (hold up) or exclude as efficient rivals (foreclosure).
On close examination, the outcome of the Article 9 Samsung case is more severe than the outcome of the Article 7 Motorola case. Whilst in Motorola, the Commission merely found an infringement and ordered Motorola to cease and desist without fines, in Samsung, the commitments decision forces Samsung to comply with a predefined licensing framework under the threat of fines. Moreover, Motorola has kept its right to appeal the decision before the General Court whilst Samsung has lost it with the commitments decision.
This is in line with our model that predicts that, with selective commitments, stronger remedies are applied for the cases closed with commitments and weaker ones for cases closed with an infringement decision. It remains to establish whether these different outcomes reflect some underlying factual differences between the cases or are due to another source of heterogeneity between firms.
Multilateral interbank fees
The MasterCard decision of 2007 and the Visa decisions of 2010 are again illustrations of the selective commitments policy. In the first decision, the Commission found that MasterCard had violated Article 101 TFEU by setting on behalf of its members (i.e. banks) multilateral interbank fees ("MIFs"). Those are fees charged by a cardholder's bank (the issuing bank) to a merchant's bank (the acquiring bank) for each sales transaction made at a merchant outlet with a payment card. Those fees are in turn often transferred by the acquiring bank to the merchant, who subsequently pass them on to customers, thus inflating consumer price. In the second decision, this time against Visa Europe, Visa Inc. and Visa International Service Association, the MasterCard 2007 decision was used as a backstop by the Commission to negotiate commitments under Article 9.
Since then, the Commission had opened two additional investigations against MasterCard and Visa, in relation to other types of MIFs and rules set by both cards' systems. Both investigations concerned similar practices, according to the Commissions own declarations. In 2014, the Commission closed the Visa case yet with another Article 9 commitments decision. The case against MasterCard is still ongoing under the Article 7 procedural route.
In so far as F and L-uncertainty are concerned, those later cases do not generate much discussion. On the one hand, there seems to be little L-uncertainty that Article 101 can apply to MIFs. In 2012, the General Court indeed upheld most of the Commissions findings in the MasterCard case of 2007, in particular that MIFs may constitute restrictions of competition.
On the other hand, there seems to be important F-uncertainty, if one is to believe the Commission. In several instances, the Commission indeed admitted that it enjoyed a poor degree of factual information on the welfare effects of MIFs, and in particular on the possibility that MIFs yield efficiencies. In 2012, the Commission ordered a study from Deloitte on Data Collection concerning Merchants' Costs of accepting Cash and Cards. A Director with DG COMP conceded that the purpose of the exercise was to "improve the Commission's own factual basis for the assessment of present and future arguments presented by stakeholders regarding the level of MIF". 19
Standard procedure
Besides cartels (they are excluded from the commitments procedure) the scope of the standard procedure in modern EU competition law is unclear. In our view, the standard procedure under Article 7 is the one likely reserved by the Commission to Article 101 TFEU hard-core restrictions in non-cartel cases: i.e. blatant by object restrictions in horizontal agreements (ONP case, CISAC agreement, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires CB , Servier) as well as in vertical agreements (resale price maintenance or market partitioning). As far as vertical agreements are concerned, however, this is difficult to confirm, because the Commissions policy is to leave such cases to national competition authorities. In Article 102 TFEU cases, the paucity of decisions gives little guidance on the types of abuse of dominance cases that the Commission will preferentially pursue under the Article 7 track (with the exception maybe, of abusive rebates, which gave rise to two Article 102 infringement decisions in Prokent/Tomra and Intel).
That said, it is abundantly clear that the standard procedure is the one preferred in antitrust cases in the telecommunications sector. In the past 10 years, all the antitrust cases related to telecommunications were dealt with under the Article 7 framework (Telekomunikacja Polska, 2011; Telefonica S. A. , 2007; Telefonica and Portugal Telecom, 2013) . And the press reports that there should be a similar outcome in the forthcoming abuse of dominance case against Slovak Telekom.
Similarly, the standard procedure also appears to be the dominant one in pharmaceutical cases. In AstraZeneca (2005), Lundbeck (2013), John-son&Johnson (2013) and Servier (2014), the Commission issued article 101 and/or 102 TFEU infringement decisions against pharmaceutical companies strategies that sought to delay generic entry into the market. None of those cases were dealt with under the Article 9 procedure. And all gave rise to significant fines.
When looked at through the findings of our model, it is passing strange that telecommunications and pharmaceutical cases are dealt with under the Article 7 standard procedure. In essence, those cases exhibit a similar degree of limited L-uncertainty and F-uncertainty as the energy cases: in both sectors, there has indeed been a wide-ranging sector inquiry (thus resolving to a certain extent F-uncertainty), and in both cases, there are stable courts precedents on the application of the competition rules (thus resolving to a certain extent, L-uncertainty). Those features should thus have led the Commission to apprehend those cases under the generalized commitments policy, which dominates the standard procedure in terms of procedural costs and enforcement results. That said, there might have been other policy reasons explaining the choice of the formal procedure in those cases. For instance, given the more advanced degree of liberalization in telecommunications, there might have been a lesser need or a lower possibility to promote entry through structural and behavioral remedies than in the energy sector, and the Commission may have preferred to inflict fines. Alternatively, the Commission may have been willing to use Article 7 to craft "model"cases that can subsequently serve as decisional proxies for its own decisional practice (as a way to remove endogenous L-uncertainty), or for the European network of national competition authorities and the national courts. For instance, the Telefonica SA decision of the Commission is often described as a landmark reference for abusive margin squeeze cases. Similarly, the Lundbeck, Johnson&Johnson and Servier cases are the first infringement cases in relation to pay for delay strategies. Altogether, those cases build a useful reference framework for national agencies in future enforcement initiatives.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the commitments procedure does not fully replicate the outcome of the formal infringement procedure, and that under some conditions, it may lead to under and/or over enforcement of the EU competition rules. Under enforcement, because the remedies applied by the Commission do not entirely eradicate the anticompetitive harm caused by the impugned practice. In brief, the remedies administered by the Com-mission are under-fixing (a type-II error). Over enforcement, because the Commission applies remedies too often. Put simply, with the commitments procedure, the Commission may be solving non-cases (a type-I error).
A critical feature of our paper is to explain that those enforcement errors may be caused by the legal uncertainty (L-uncertainty) and factual uncertainty (F-uncertainty) that surrounds the interaction between the agency and the firm. In particular, we show that the influence of L and F-uncertainty on the risk of enforcement errors depends on the type of enforcement policy followed by the Commission, i.e. a generalized commitments policy, a selective commitments policy, or a formal enforcement policy. With this, we are able to formulate a number of policy recommendations that could help agencies refine their enforcement strategies with a view to achieving a more optimal enforcement mix.
More fundamentally, our findings pave the way for further research. Firstly, in the future, we intend to improve our understanding of the determinants of F and L-uncertainty, and provide a more exhaustive conceptualization of those parameters. For instance, we will try to integrate the existence of complaints in F-uncertainty. The existence of complaints is indeed likely to reduce F-uncertainty, because complainants can supply the Commission with whatever industry data it needs. Similarly, the fact that the Commission has issued a Statement of Objections (or a Letter of Facts or Supplementary Statement of Objections) should also be integrated in our model, for it also likely diminishes F-uncertainty (in addition to increasing the reluctance of the Commission to abandon the Article 7 track). Finally, the presence in the industry of a sector specific regulator could be factored-in because it reduces both L-uncertainty (because companies are used to face regulatory constraints) and F-uncertainty (because regulators and antitrust agencies often cooperate).
Secondly, we tend to believe that our model could reach a higher degree of granularity in relation to L-uncertainty, in the sense that a distinction could be drawn between Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU cases. In particular, the application of "rule of reason"-type analysis or the admission of efficiency defenses is more widespread in Article 101 cases than in Article 102 cases. In turn, this suggests that L-uncertainty may be higher in Article 101 TFEU cases than in Article 102 TFEU cases. On the other hand, there is a considerable amount of soft law guidance under Article 101 TFEU, and the rate of success of appeals in Article 101 cases is certainly higher than in Article 102 TFEU cases (which are almost never dismissed by the Court of Justice). Finally, our model could reach a higher degree of accuracy within the Article 102 cases by distinguishing between exclusionary abuse cases and exploitative abuse cases, for the later are often deemed to generate insuperable evidentiary issues. By the same token, our analysis of the Article 101 cases could distinguish between horizontal and vertical cases, for the later are generally smaller cases, where F-uncertainty is presumably lower. And in the same vein, the model could distinguish between restriction by object and restriction by effect cases, given that the degree of F-uncertainty is considerably smaller in "object"cases.
Finally, we hope to enrich our model so as to control for the bargaining dynamics inherent in the negotiation of commitments. For instance, we do not test the relevance of who is the first to make the offer to negotiate commitments, i.e. the Commission or the firm. Indeed, there may be some ground to believe that the bargaining power lies with the agent that does not solicit the opening of commitments negotiations. In the same perspective, the model should integrate parameters such as the intensity of judicial review, the presence of a Statement of Objections, the participation of formal complainants to the procedure, as well as their number, the existence of parallel cases with the same firm, be it before the Commission or before the EU Courts, etc. All those factors, and others, potentially affect the Commission and the parties' bargaining power.
